Economia Politica. Rivista di teoria e analisi

Sommari degli articoli pubblicati nel n.2, 2000
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Content of no.2, 2000 
The Teaching of Economics in the Engineering Faculties (J.E.L.: A2)
by Adriano Birolo
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In this note, topics and sequence of the economic courses within the curricula of the Engineering faculties are discussed. The non-harmonisation of the topics of the economic courses with the cultural and formative design of the Engineering faculties can be seen as an important, though not exclusive, reason to explain why economics is slid into the present marginal position.
Cooperation and Competition in the Learning Organization: Preliminar Results from a Simulation Model (J.E.L.: O33, J41)
by Gian Carlo Cainarca and Francesca Sgobbi
The paper deals with the transaction of labour within the Learning Organisation (LO), i.e. the organisation which turns knowledge creation and knowledge sharing into critical success factors. The model of the LO has gained increasing attention from both the managerial and the academic world thanks to its prospective capability to deal with higher degrees of uncertainty and change than the "traditional" Fordist-Taylorist organisation. In the LO the emphasis on workers as potential knowledge creators derives from recognising the presence of an "intellectual" component into the supplied effort. As a consequence, the metaphor of labour as a "material resource" results no more suitable, and new mechanisms are needed to motivate and to fuel the employees' commitment. In particular, the paper models the interaction among workers at a LO where the principal sets a bonus for those who provide the better performance both in terms of physical productivity and organisational knowledge increase. The workers' commitment to the LO's targets results from the contemporary presence of both co-operative and competitive forces. The model, which builds on Akerlof's model of "gifts exchange" between employer and employees and on the closed rank tournament theory, has been implemented into a simulation programme which relaxes the neo-classical constraint on the individuals' perfect rationality. The parameters driving the tournament outcome relate to the environment where the LO operates, on LO itself, and the characteristics of workers, which are allowed for not homogeneity. The simulations point out the existence of a threshold for the intensity of competition, beyond which the benefits resulting from the accelerated accumulation of organisational knowledge are more than balanced by the lack of motivation of those workers excluded from the competition for the higher bonuses. The simulations also show how the co-operative rather than competitive nature of industrial relations within the LO depends from the boundary conditions which shape the internal and external labour markets.
Economics and the Principle of Uniformity (J.E.L.: B41)
by Donald W. Katzner
This paper argues that both aspects of the principle of uniformity, namely, substantive uniformitarianism or the statement that the rates of change of processes are constant through time, and methodological uniformitarianism or the more general assertion that the laws governing phenomena are invariant over time and across space, have no place in economic explanation because they preclude the consideration of significant components of economic reality. In particular, cultural differences are likely to cause economic laws to vary across space, and the realities of historical time are likely to render both economic laws and rates of change nonconstant through time.
Concorrenza posizionale in istruzione, mobilità e crescita (J.E.L.: J24, J62, C45, D62)
di Raimondello Orsini
In un modello a generazioni sovrapposte con razionamento del credito, l'accumulazione di capitale umano è soggetta a due diverse forme di esternalità: oltre ai consueti effetti esterni positivi derivanti dai benefici sociali dell'istruzione, vi è una esternalità posizionale dovuta al fatto che ogni agente prende le proprie decisioni di consumo e investimento sapendo che la remunerazione del proprio lavoro sarà basata sul livello relativo di capitale umano posseduto, e non sul suo livello assoluto. Le simulazioni numeriche del modello, caratterizzato da particolari ipotesi riguardo al comportamento degli agenti e alla struttura delle retribuzioni dei fattori di produzione, mostrano una relazione positiva tra mobilità sociale, livello di meritocrazia e crescita economica.
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