Economia Politica. Rivista di teoria e analisi
Abstracts of articles published in no.1, 2000
Sommari degli articoli pubblicati nel n.1, 2000
Summaries
Introductory Note
International Co-operation and Local Development
by Gilberto Antonelli and Sandro Montresor
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This paper deals with some of the implications that the advent of the 'globalisation-era' has had on the relationships between co-operation (especially international) and development (especially local) and, throughout the same nexus, between development, innovation and structural change at different levels of analysis, i.e. national, international and local. Some of the 'problem-posing' and 'problem-solving' approaches that are most necessary in a globalised world of 'co-operated development' are put forward. The core factors of an increasingly complex setting are identified, and some methodological approaches and analytical tools we maintain particularly suitable in disentangling them are suggested.
Articles
The Origin of the Concept of Stationarity: The Adam Smith's Paradigm of "Aurea Medietas (J.E.L.: B12)
by Robertop Censolo
In this paper we employ a particular analysis of the continuity between the Theory of moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations, to show that
the smithian concept of economic equilibrium displays its "gravitating" and normative role, operating not as an objective reference, pointing out
the social consequences of the interactions among perfectly rational agents, but as a weaker reference of reasonableness and common sense.
The impossibility to derive a perfectly virtuous (rational) equilibrium depends on the dichotomy between natural and real price. This dichotomy
originates from the peculiar conformation of the human nature, and from the basic principles supervising human actions. Therefore, we shifted
the analysis to those parts of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, where Smith works out a general theory of human action, aiming at realizing in
what sense the "aurea medietas" character of the competitive market equilibrium might be desirable, i.e. "virtuous", from the point of view of a
hypothetical social planner. To address this question we had first to make clear which virtue characterizes human actions as long as they are
consistent with the concept of "aurea medietas". It appeared that it is the virtue of prudence this basic principle of conduct, which influences
individual choices through a complex mechanism, of which rationality is just one of the working parts, and that cannot exist without the active
support of moral judgments delivered by the principles of sympathy and of the impartial spectator.
Social Norms and Individual Sanctioning (J.E.L.: D10)
by Tommaso Luzzati
In the economics literature on social customs it is usually assumed that the individual can choose only whether
or not to obey any given social norm, and that (exogenous) social sanctions influence such decisions. However,
it must be recognised that the individual decides also the informal punishment to be inflicted upon those who
violate society’s norms. The present paper takes such aspect into account and singles out, by means of a
simple model, some behavioural hypotheses able to produce an overall sanctioning level that would maintain
respect of norms as an equilibrium state. The analysis concludes with study of one possible dynamic evolution
of the model showing the maintenance of several equilibria with social norms.
Delegation, Bargaining and the Nature of the Trade Union (J.E.l.: J51, C78, D23)
by Guido Merzoni
In this paper the Trade Union is described as an organisation where workers delegate authority to a leader in order to save on co-ordination
costs. These co-ordination costs are due to the difficulties of reaching an agreement among workers and to contracts incompleteness. In
particular, we study how different delegation arrangements affect the outcome of wage bargaining. We show that workers may benefit from
delegating the authority on wage bargaining to a professional Union leader, who does not need to bear directly the costs of industrial actions.
Delegation allows the workers to make the threat of using the most effective industrial actions credible, even though those industrial actions are
the most costly for the workers themselves. In particular, we consider the choice between going on strike and working to rule. If working to rule
is much less effective in damaging the firm and less costly for the workers than going on strike, a Union led by a professional will use going on
strike as a credible threat. Both the equilibrium wage and the number of employed workers will be higher with the delegation of authority to a
professional leader than in the case when workers bargain directly with the firm and the credible threat is working to rule. Our analysis has
important implications for the debate on the degree of democracy within the Trade Union. It shows that there is a trade-off between the
effectiveness of the Union in bargaining and its members' direct participation to the decisional process.
Enzo Paci's Reflection about Political Economy: An Economical-philosophical Analysis (J.E.L.: B31, B40)
by Ivan Moscati
This paper provides a theoretical examination of the inquiry of the Italian philosopher Enzo Paci (1911-1976) into the foundations of political economy. The article opens with an illustration of the issue of scientific knowledge in Edmund Husserl's phenomenology to which Paci refers. After clarifying the specific sense in which Paci conceives the task of science's foundation, this discussion illustrates his thesis, which links political economy to the experience of need. Two interpretations of Paci's thesis, both plausible, are then critically discussed. Paci's interpretation of Marx's critique of political economy is subsequently examined and his reading of Keynes's General theory is discussed. Although Paci's inquiry is interesting because it delivers the epistemological reflection about economics from a purely methodological and formalistic perspective, it fails in its purpose. In conclusion the reasons for this failure are analysed; how an inquiry into the foundations of political economy ought to be stated in order to have a philosophical and epistemological relevance and in order to be significant in elaborating economic theory is pointed out.
Review Article
Dyanamics Models of Union Behaviour: Critical Extension (J.E.L.: J51, C61, C73)
by Bruno Chiarini and Enrico Marchetti
The paper describes the basic features of the standard dynamic model of monopoly union in a critical perspective. Starting by the
Kidd-Oswalad-Jones-McKenna dynamic models, we suggest some developments and extensions, aimed to underline the importance of dynamic
and strategic aspects, ignored by the standard literature. Using differential game theory, we show different solutions, in terms of wages and
employment, due to the explicit analysis of the strategic-dynamic interaction between union and firms, providing a comparative analysis with the
conventional static models.
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